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Abstract
We use a variety of nonparametric test statistics to evaluate the inflation- 
targeting regimes of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK.
We argue that a sensible approach of evaluation must rely on a variety of 
methods, among them nonparametric econometric methods, for robustness 
and completeness. Our evaluation strategy is based on examining three 
possible policy implications of inflation targeting: First, a welfare implication;  
second, a real variability implication.  The welfare implication involves 
evaluating consumption and leisure per person by testing whether their 
distributions of levels and the growth rates remained unchanged under 
inflation targeting.  Then we introduce nonparametric univariate and 
multivariate statistical methods to test whether the conditional variance of a 
variety of real variables, such as the real exchange rate depreciation rate, real 
GDP per capita growth rate in addition to private consumption per capita and 
leisure per capita growth rates, remained unchanged under inflation targeting, 
decreased or increased significantly.  Third, we examine whether inflation-
targeting policies eliminated boom-bust housing cycles.  For control we also 
examine the US data during periods of high and low inflation before and after 
1984.
JEL Classification C02, C12, C14,E31 
Key Words: distributional dominance, sudden shift in conditional variance, inflation targeting, 
great moderation, boom-bust housing cycles.A Nonparametric Approach to Evaluating Inflation Targeting Regimes 
1. Introduction 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK adopted inflation-
targeting policy and successfully maintained relatively low and stable inflation 
rates from the early 1990s to-date.  This paper provides a nonparametric 
approach to evaluating inflation targeting.  We argue that a sensible approach 
of evaluation must rely on a variety of methods, among them nonparametric 
econometric methods, and even non econometric methods, for robustness 
and completeness.
Policy evaluation requires evaluating the costs and the benefits of the policy.
The evaluation of inflation targeting as a monetary policy regime in this paper 
is based on examining three possible implications of the policy: First is a 
relative welfare implication, i.e. the benefits, and second is a relative real 
variability implication, i.e., the costs.  For the benefits, we examine the level 
and the growth rate of consumption and leisure per person of working age, 
which are the basic arguments in the utility function.  And for the costs, we will 
examine the conditional variability of real GDP per person of working age, 
consumption per person of working age, leisure per person of working age 
and the real exchange rate depreciation rate.  We also examine the effects of 
the policy on boom-bust cycles in the housing markets.
Monetary policy does not have a real effect in the long run, i.e., the neutrality 
proposition.  Inflation is independent of real output in the long run, i.e., the 
Phillips curve is vertical.  However, monetary policy can have a real effect in 
the short run and over the business cycle frequencies for a variety of, 
debatable, reasons.  Among those are price stickiness, menu cost, and 
misperception, etc.
There is no argument, however, that inflation raises the cost of living.  It 
adversely affects the consumption of goods and services. Wage inflation does 
the same for leisure.  Wage inflation makes leisure expensive.  Central banks 
tell more stories about how inflation affects aggregate demand, consumption 
and investment.  There are a few channels. Most obvious is the interest rate 
channel, which affects the demand for goods and services. Higher interest 
rates normally induce lower household's consumption and  more savings.  In 
other words, it lowers current consumption relative to future consumption, i.e., 
the intertemporal substitution.  Consumption also falls because existing loans 
cost more in terms of interest payments. Finally, higher interest rates mean 
that the price of both financial and real assets - shares, bonds, property, etc. - 
falls in that the present value of future returns drops when interest rates rise. 
Households are less willing to consume when faced with declining wealth. 
The question is whether low and stable price and wage inflation increase the 
levels and the growth rates of consumption and leisure per capita, over the 
period of the policy horizon. 
The relative variability implication stems from the possibility that certain 
monetary regimes such as inflation targeting may induce real changes in the 
short run.  Stabilization of inflation might be achieved on the expense of 
making other variables unstable.A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Mussa (1986) and Backus et al. (1995) among others suggest that the 
exchange rate regime is not neutral.  In other words, the distributions of real 
variables may differ across monetary regimes. Monacell (2004), for example, 
provides different views.  Milton Friedman, in his "Inflation and 
Unemployment,” Nobel Memorial Lecture, December 13, 1976, said that the 
increase in the variability of inflation or expected inflation may raise the 
natural level of unemployment maybe through reducing the efficiency of the 
prices to carry information to economic agents.   The point is that inflation and 
the variability of inflation could have a short-run real effect. 
Initial inspection of the data suggest that the distributions of real variables 
changed.  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for key real variables before 
and after inflation targeting for the five countries in our sample.  These 
statistics show that the mean and the variance have changed.  Similarly, both 
the means and the standard deviations seem to have changed in the US even 
though the US did not adopt an explicit inflation-targeting policy.  Note, 
however, that these changes do not constitute test statistics.   
We test the welfare and the real variability implications for periods before and 
after inflation-targeting regimes for the five countries mentioned above.  We 
compare the results to the US, which experienced periods of low inflation and 
high inflation.  Bernanke (2004) identified two different monetary policy 
regimes in the US, a high inflation regime before 1984 and a low inflation 
regime 1984 onwards.  He attributed these outcomes to differences policies, 
which contributed, according to Bernanke, to the so called the Great 
Moderation.
For the welfare implications we use a variety of nonparametric tests to test for 
the equality of distributions of different policy regimes, i.e., before and after 
inflation targeting.  We find low inflation periods are associated with welfare 
improvement.  The level of real private consumption per person has 
significantly increased during the periods of low and stable inflation.  The 
same happened in the US.  Leisure, however, declined in all countries, except 
for Sweden.  Households seem to have substituted more consumption for 
leisure.
For the variability implication, we test whether real variables exhibited 
statistically significant sudden large shifts in their conditional variances after 
inflation targeting. We find no significant change in the real variability across 
regimes, except at points when the regime changes, e.g., Sweden's real GDP 
and consumption per capita growth rates and Canada's leisure per person 
growth rate.  Our test statistics cast some doubt about the Great Moderation 
phenomena; i.e., changes in the variability of real data over time are not 
statistically significant.
Finally, we examined boom-bust cycles by examining the relationship 
between real interest rates and house price cycles during the periods of 
inflation targeting.  In all countries, except New Zealand which maintained 
positive real interest rates, there exists a negative relationship between real 
interest rates and house prices at the business cycle frequencies.  This A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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negative relationship is usually associated with bubbles in housing markets, 
e.g., Japan in the 1980s and Hong Kong in the 1990s.
Our evaluation suggests that inflation targeting as a policy per se is not 
different from a policy that aims at keeping inflation low and stable such as the 
fed's policy after 1984.  Low and stable inflation periods are associated with 
increased consumption levels, and growth rates in some countries, most likely 
due to lower costs of living and low interest rates. Except at the points of 
regime changes, real outcomes during the periods of low and stable inflation 
are not more or less variable than real outcomes during the periods of high 
inflation.  And, except for central banks that kept positive real interest rates 
such as New Zealand, inflation targeting countries share with the US a 
negative correlation between real interest rate and house prices at the 
business cycle frequency, which is typically associated with bubbles. 
Next we will present three nonparametric tests from the theory of permutation 
and rank tests. In section 3 we present a multivariate test statistics for sudden 
and large shifts in the conditional variance of a system of variables, along with 
a univariate test of the same effect.  In section 4 we describe the data.  In 5.1, 
implement the ranking tests.  We will compare the entire distributions of two 
real variables before and after inflation targeting.  In section 5.2 we apply the 
univariate and multivariate tests to the data.   In section 5.3 we examine 
boom-bust cycles and monetary policy.  Section 6 is a conclusion. 
2. The  welfare  implication 
We begin with evaluating the welfare implication of inflation targeting.
Households under a policy regime A (low and stable inflation) are better off 
than households under a policy regime B (high and variable inflation) if the 
distribution of some real outcomes of regime Adominates the distribution of 
the same real outcomes of regimeB .  From the welfare implication point of 
view, the vector of outcomes of the regime, could be real consumption and 
leisure per capita, which are the usual arguments in the utility function.
Throughout this paper we maintain that regime Ais independent of 
regimeB from policy standpoint (no Lucas critique) even though we rely on 
nonparametric test statistics from the theory of permutation and rank tests.  In 
a related field, the literature of stochastic dominance provides a variety of 
tests that also aim at ranking of distributions; they differ in the null hypothesis. 
Common tests were derived under the null hypothesis of dominance. For 
example, McFadden (1989), Klecan et al. (1991) use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness of fit test, and Anderson (1996) uses the Pearson test.  
Davidson and Duclos (2000) derive the test under the null of equality of the 
two distributions.
We choose three tests from this theory.  The first test is the Wilcoxon (1945) 
Rank Sum test, which is also known as the Mann-Whitney (1947) two-sample 
statistic.  It is a test for assessing whether two samples come from the same 
distribution. The null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from a 
single population, and therefore their probability distributions are equal. It A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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requires the two samples to be independent, and the observations to be 
ordinal or continuous measurements, i.e. one can at least say, of any two 
observations, which is the greater. This test is one of the best-known non-
parametric significance tests. It was proposed initially by Wilcoxon (1945), for 
equal sample sizes, and extended to arbitrary sample sizes and in other ways 
by Mann and Whitney (1947). MWW is virtually identical to performing an 
ordinary parametric two-sample t test on the data after ranking over the 
combined samples.
i In general, let  m X X  , 1 be iid with any distribution 
function ) (x F , and  m Y Y  1 are iid with any distribution function  ) (x G . The null 
hypothesis is  ) , ( ), ( ) ( : 0     x each x G x F H . However, it is trickier when it 
comes to the alternative hypothesis just like the literature on stochastic 
dominance because the alternative hypothesis could take different forms.
One possible and common form is to assume a shift model like 
) ( ) (    x F x G , and then the alternative hypothesis is written in terms of, as 
0 : 1   H . Another version is  ) , ( ), ( ) ( : 2     x each x G x F H and with a strict 
inequality for at least onex. G is said to be stochastically larger thanF . 2 H is
a larger class of alternatives because  1 ) , ( H G F  implies  2 ) , ( H G F  . The 
other alternative in terms of Mann – Whitney statistic is 
2
1
: 3  XY H 	 .  These 
large alternatives regarding the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test are well-documented 
in the literature, see Randles and Wolfe (1979, p. 130-132).
The second test is the Pearson test, Anderson (1996).  It is a nonparametric 
K-sample test for the equality of median. It tests the null hypothesis that K 
samples were drawn from populations with the same median.  In the case of 
two samples, the test statistic is distributed chi-squared and calculated with 
and without a continuity correction.  We report only one statistic; fewer more 
statistics are calculated, but they are not reported because they have the 
same p values.
The third test is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, which is a well known non-
parametric test to test for the equality of distributions.   Non rejection of the 
null by this test is probably an indication of the weakness of this test in cases 
where there are differences in the tail of the distributions.  However, it is very 
powerful for the alternatives that involve clustering in the data5F
ii
Wagner (2006) and Razzak (2009) use these methods to test for first-order 
stochastic dominance. However, we are really interested in rejecting the null 
hypothesis of equality of the distributions of consumption and leisure before 
and after the implementation of the inflation targeting policy.
3.  The variability implication: testing for large shifts in the 
distribution
Firstly, for the univariate straightforward case, we test the hypothesis that the 
conditional variance of  a single real variable, e.g., real GDP per person,  has 
not changed versus the alternative hypothesis that it has suddenly shifted.  A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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We compute the followings, in the order shown, to arrive at a statistic for the 
conditional variance: 
2 2 / ) 1 ( 1 
 i i i S n V    ; 
) ( 2 1 i n i V H
i   ; and 
) ( ) ( 3
1 2
i i i S R 
  
Where i V  is the statistic for a sudden shift in the variance, which is distributed 
chi-squared,
2
i S is the sample variance,  i n is the number of observation or the 
window for which the variance is computed; 
2 
 is a pooled or overall variance 






i i i m n S n
1
2 / ) 1 ( , where iis the number of samples 
= m  , 2 , 1 . We map  i V  onto a standard normal distribution to make the 
presentation of the results easy.  (.) H is the distribution function of the chi-
squared random variable with  1  i n degrees-of-freedom and 
1   is the inverse 
of the standard normal distribution function.
We plot  ) (
2
i i S R , which is distributed standard normal, with upper and lower 
control limits.  The limits usually take the value  
 3  .  These limits, under a 
standard normal distribution function, are prediction or tolerance limits for the 
distributions of ) (
2
i i S R .  A  
 3   control limit constitutes a band of 0.99730 
prediction intervals for future values of the ) (
2
i i S R  according to the 
Tchebysheff’s theorem7F
iii  Values that fall in the tails of the standard normal 
curve are significantly different from values elsewhere under the bell-shaped 
curve, and constitute large and sudden jumps.
This chart is designed to function as alarm system.  It signals cases where 
deviations of observations from the mean, for  example, are greater than
 .
They are also designed so that the probability of false alarm is small if the 
process is in statistical control.  The probability of a false alarm is equal to 
) (  , which is a type II error.  This is the probability of a shift equal to 
  that 
will not be detected. The probability of detecting such a shift is  ) ( 1    ,
which is the power of the test: 
  i n Z | | ) ( 4 2 /        ,
Whereis the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  We can 
calculate the power of the test for detecting sudden large shifts in the 
moments, so for example, with  5  i n and 5 . 1   the power is 
638 . 0 )} 5 5 . 1 3 ( ) 5 5 . 1 3 ( { 1 1            .   For an economic application 
of these control statistics see Razzak (1991).  For other similar test statistics 
that are used in economic literature see Inclan and Tiao (1994) who use 
CUSUM tests and Chen and Gupta (1997).A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Secondly, we provide  a multivariate test for the equality of the variance for 
variables.  For a multivariate normal variable 
T T X X X X    2 1, , where 
each X is iid , the superscript T denotes transpose, and the variance (of the 
population) is a function called the Generalized Variance, which is the 
determinant of a matrix, .
The determinant of the sample variance matrix 
2 S is called the Sample 
Generalized Variance, where
2 S is the sample covariance matrix based on 
sample of sizen.8F
iv
Anderson (1958) shows that a convenient statistic for the generalized 

















n D 0 
And m k  2 , 1  .
The matrix 
2 S is computed by: 
And   is approximately: 
Which is the mean of
2 S .
Unfortunately, for  3   , the statistic k D has no exact distribution so we cannot 
test for the significance level.  Ganadesikan and Gupta (1970) approximated 
the distribution by a (Gamma) distribution with two parameters, a shape and 
a scale parameter,.  They showed that the  distribution is best approximated 
when 10  n .
The shape parameter is: 
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Just like what we have done earlier to simplify the interpretation and the 
presentation of the results, we transform the distribution into a standard 
normal by computing the following:
WhereG is the distribution function of the Gamma distribution with the two 
parameters above, and then the inverse of  k u
) ( ) ( 11
1
k k i u D R
  
) ( k i D R and ) (
2
i i S R are distributed standard normal and therefore the values 
could be  (.) 0 (.) R R     .  In this case ) ( k i D R will take positive and negative 
values. 
Just like the previous univariate statistics, a significant increase implies values 
of ) ( k D R > 
 3  .9F
v
4.  The data  
See data appendix for definitions and sources.  We choose Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK because   These countries 
adopted inflation targeting earlier than other countries, thus they have a 
longer span of data. The data cover the period March 1980 to December 
2007.  New Zealand data are shorter, from 1987 to 2007.  In addition, we 
examine the US data from June 1975 to December 2007.  We use private 
consumption, leisure, GDP, and the real effective exchange rate.  We plot the 
log level of private consumption per person of working age in figure 1; and in 
figure 2 log leisure, which we define 100 – hours worked assuming that 
households have 100 hours of possible work time a week.  Figure 3 plots the 
first difference of the log of real GDP per person of working age. The real 
exchange depreciation rates are plotted in figure 4.  These data will be used 
in sections 5.1 and 5.2 to examine the first and second implications of the 
policy, i.e., the welfare and real variability implications.  All log levels have 
trend.  We test the data for unit root and we could not reject it.10F
vi In section 5.3 
we examine the boom-bust cycles in the housing markets. The data will be 
described later. 
5. Results 
  Testing the welfare implications of the policy 
We test whether real private consumption and leisure per person of working 
age in levels and in growth rates (first difference of the log level) have equal 
distributions during periods prior and during inflation targeting.
vii
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The periods before inflation targeting are: March 1980 to December 1992 for 
Australia; March 1980 to December 1990 for Canada; June 1987 to 
December 1988 for New Zealand; March 1980 to December 1992 for Sweden 
and March 1980 to December 1991 for the UK.  For the US, the data for the 
period of high inflation rate are from June 1975 to March 1983 and the period 
of low inflation are from March 1984 to December 2007.
Table 2 reports the p values of the statistics for three tests described in 
section 2.  The table has six columns.  The first column reports the countries, 
the second reports the variables, the third reports the p values for the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (the Mann and Whitney test), the fourth column 
reports the probability that distributions in regimeB (before inflation targeting) 
are greater than those in regime A.  In column five we report the p value for 
testing whether the medians are equal across the two regimes. Finally we 
report the p value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
For all countries, there is a strong rejection to the hypothesis that log private 
consumption per person is equal across regimes, the p values are zero.  The 
probability that the PDF is greater before inflation targeting is also small. The 
medians are unequal and the Kolomogrov-Smirnov also rejects the equality 
with zero p values.  Distributions of the levels of consumption are significantly 
larger and dominant under inflation targeting. The same is true for the US 
under low inflation regime.
Not so with the log leisure, Australia's log leisure per person declined during 
inflation targeting.  The equality hypothesis is rejected in favour of regimeB .
The probability that leisure in regimeB is greater than that in regime A is 
0.897.  The medians are unequal and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov p value is 
zero, which also rejects equality.  The same is true for the UK and the US.
Canada’s distribution of leisure before inflation targeting and after inflation 
targeting seem equal; the p value for the Rank Sum test is 0.981. The 
probability that leisure before inflation targeting dominates is about half. The 
medians of the two distributions are equal; the p value is 0.847. The p value 
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov is 0.966. Thus, Canada’s level of leisure per 
capita has not significantly changed under inflation targeting.   For New 
Zealand, the equality of distributions of leisure is rejected with a p value of the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test equal to 0.045.  The probability that leisure in
regimeB is greater than that under inflation targeting is 0.339. The hypotheses 
of the equality of the medians has a p value of 0.167.  The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic has p value of 0.138.   Leisure most probably declined in 
New Zealand under inflation targeting. The level of leisure per person has 
significantly statistically increased in Sweden under regime A of inflation 
targeting.  P values of all tests are zero.  Sweden is the only country with 
significant increase in the log of leisure per capita under inflation targeting.
Because the log levels might have unit roots and that could render the P 
values of the test statistics invalid, we also examine the growth rates of 
consumption and leisure per capital.A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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For Australia, there is a significant evidence that the growth rate of 
consumption under inflation targeting dominates.  The same is true in New 
Zealand and Sweden.  Consumption growth is dominant under inflation 
targeting regimes in three out of five countries.  We still cannot reject the 
equality in Canada.  The probability that consumption growth before inflation 
targeting is > growth after inflation targeting is 0.57.  And, consumption 
growth has probably remained unchanged in the UK and the US. 
Because the US is not an explicit inflation targeting country and our results for 
consumption growth are 3 out of 6 countries, our results may imply that low 
inflation, not necessarily inflation targeting, has positive welfare implications, 
whether inflation is targeted or not.  We interpret the results as being largely 
supportive of a policy of low inflation, although they vary only slightly across 
countries.
  Testing the variability of the real variables 
We apply the univariate and multivariate tests for sudden change in the 
variance to the first difference of log: real effective exchange rate (the real 
depreciation rate), real GDP per person, real private consumption per person 
and leisure per person.   
We choose a sample size of 8 quarters for the window to compute the 
statistic ) (
2
i S R in equation (3), which is consistent with the medium term 
horizon used for policy by central banks.  We plot the test statistics in figures 
5-8.
viii
Each figure includes the statistic ) (
2
i i S R before inflation targeting (regime B )
represented by black dots and after inflation targeting (regime A) represented 
by white dots.  The plots denote standard normal distribution with control 
limits 
 3  . Points that exceed the  
 3  represent statistically significant 
sudden shifts in the conditional variance. 
Central banks have been wary about excess variability. The Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Policy Targets Agreement with the minister of finance signed in 
December 16, 1999 added the following clause to the original 1989 
Agreement, “(c) In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall 
implement monetary policy in a sustainable, consistent and transparent 
manner and shall seek to avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest 
rates and the exchange rate.”  There is also a reasonably large literature on 
the Great Moderation, see the cited papers in Bernanke (2004).  This 
literature suggests that macroeconomic (i.e., real GDP) volatility have 
declined in the 1990s, thus the Great Moderation, and attempts to explain 
why.  Many different reasons where advanced such as structural 
microeconomic changes and better monetary policy. Stock and Watson 
(2002) for example argued that there favourable shocks played a big role in all 
that.A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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In figure 5, we plot the univariate  ) (
2
i i S R statistics for GDP per person growth 
rates for all countries.  All the black dots which represent the pre inflation 
targeting periods are inside the 
 3  , meaning that the conditional variance is 
stable for all countries including the US.  There is one white dot outside 
the 
 3   limit.  Sweden experienced a statistically significant sudden jump in 
the conditional variance of real GDP per person in 1993-1994 right at the 
point of regime change.
ix
Figure 6 plots the univariate statistics for consumption per person growth 
rates. No significant shifts in the conditional variance is found during the 
period before inflation targeting.  Sweden alone experienced significant shifts 
in 1993-1994 at the change of regime point, and another in 2005-2006.  For 
the US, the two regimes, low and high inflation, are statistically stable. 
Most of the instability is found in leisure.  Signals of large and sudden shifts in 
the conditional variance occurred in Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the 
UK.  Figure 7 shows that the UK is most unstable with multiple jumps under 
both regimes, before and after inflation targeting.  Canada experienced 
instability in the first year of inflation targeting. The labour supply seems most 
affected, which is something central banks do not seem to discuss often. 
Again, the US is most stable.
x
Figure 8 plots the real exchange rate depreciation rates.  Australia and 
Canada’s variability is unchanged across regimes, and largely stable.  New 
Zealand’s variability is much improved under inflation targeting.  All the 
instability in New Zealand are found during the period before inflation 
targeting.  Sweden too, has a stable real exchange rate under inflation 
targeting. The UK experienced a jolt at the first two years of the adoption on 
inflation-targeting regime.  We find no evidence of instability in the US data.
We would like to emphasize that the samples we use for defining inflation 
targeting regimes overlap with some changes in the exchange rate regimes in 
the UK and Sweden.  Both left the European Exchange Rate Mechanism at 
the same time, floated, and adopted inflation-targeting policy.
Figure 9 plots the multivariate conditional Sample Generalized Variance 
) ( k i D R .  The samples are slightly different from previous ones. In a few cases 
we had to choose 7 quarters instead of 8.  The results are reported in table 3.
The US has one large jump in the variance in the years 1984-1985.  Many 
studies have identified a break in the conditional variance of the US real GDP 
data around that point (see for example, Bernanke (2004) for more references 
and Stock and Watson (2002) among many studies on the Great Moderation).
New Zealand also experienced a sudden shift in 1988-1990 the year inflation 
targeting was adopted officially. Sweden experienced two large shifts, one is 
in the same year of adopting inflation targeting in 1993-1994, and one in the 
year just before.  Australia also had a jolt in 1994-1995, early at inflation 
targeting.  Canada is the only country that experienced a large shift in the 
multivariate Sample Generalized Variance in 1980-1982, and we have no 
explanation for it.A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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In summary and across all tests, the number of black dots (before inflation 
targeting) that lie outside the  
 3   prediction intervals is equal to the number 
of white dots (during inflation targeting).  There is no strong evidence that 
inflation targeting increased or decreased real variability. However, 
uncertainty increases sharply during in the year immediately after changing 
the regime or at the beginning of the sample, whether before or after inflation 
targeting. The US which is not an inflation targeting country exhibited no 
significant real variability in both periods of low and high inflation, either.  Our 
tests do not lend a lot of support to the Great Moderation story.  Perhaps 
there is a moderation, but not great moderation. Variability changed both 
visually (see figure 3) and (table 1), but the changes are statistically 
insignificant. 
5.3 Housing boom-bust cycles 
Taylor (2007) argued that the decline that occurred in the average size of the 
fluctuations in residential constructions in the US in the early 1980s measured 
by standard deviations was due to improved monetary policy.  Similar 
arguments for improved monetary policy are made in Bernanke (2004) and in 
Blanchard and Riggi (2009). Stabilizing inflation at low levels and anchoring 
inflation expectations are the good reasons for the Great Moderation.
Central banks in inflation-targeting countries do not follow systematic ways, 
e.g., the Taylor rule, in setting short-term interest rates, rather they enjoy full 
discretion in setting the interest rates on quarterly basis.   They also adjust 
interest rates in-between quarters. They produce forecasts on quarterly 
basis, and along with other information, they assess the nature and the 
permanency of the shocks and then discuss policy setting.  The process 
produces policy errors from time to time either because of forecasts errors or 
bad judgments, or both. These errors could be serially correlated and highly 
persistent.  Eventually, these policy errors could adversely affect the formation 
of inflation expectations, hence the real interest rate.
High inflation expectations over the business cycle frequency can push real 
interest rates down for long periods of time or into negative territories.  All 
countries have episodes of negative real interest rates, except New Zealand, 
which remained positive all the times.   
Negative real interest rate stimulates the demand for housing.  If the supply of 
land and housing is inelastic, see for example Glaeser et al. (2008), shifts in 
the demand fuel housing price inflation. Taylor (2007) finds episodes similar to 
these in the US.  In effect monetary policy can still create boom-bust cycles in 
the housing market.  Thus, the covariance of the real interest rate and the 
house price over the short-term business cycle is expected to be negative. 
We compute the short – term real interest rate  1    t t t i r ! , where  t i is the 
nominal interest rate,  1  t ! is the CPI annualized inflation rate as a proxy for 
expected inflation.  Housing prices are also in real terms.  We remove the 
trend (fluctuations occur at frequency > 32 quarters) and the noise A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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(fluctuations occur at frequencies < 6 quarters) from the data and focus on the 
business cycle frequency in between using Christiano – Fitzgerald's (2003) 
time-varying asymmetric Band-Pass filter.   Figures 10 and 11 plot the levels 
and the de-trended real interest rates and house prices. 
Figure 12 includes confidence ellipse for lagged de-trended real interest rates 
and de-trended house price. The real interest rates are up to 8 quarters lag.
We use the sample over the periods of inflation targeting, and for the US over 
the period from 1984.  The relationships are significantly negative, except for 
New Zealand and Australia, where real interest rate is uncorrelated with real 
house prices over the cycle.  New Zealand had some mild increase in house 
prices during 2005–2007, but not as significant as it is in other countries.  As 
shown in figure 10, New Zealand had run most tight monetary policy among 
all other central banks, hence real interest rates were among the highest in 
Western countries (the means are 3.7, 3.3, 5.6, 3.4, 3.4 and 2.1 for Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK and the US respectively).  Australia 
has only a few quarters of negative real interest rates in September 2000- 
June 2001, and in the first three quarters of 2008.  The housing markets, 
especially in New Zealand, has been relatively calm.  Higher real interest 
rates could have been beneficial in that regard, but not without a cost.  There 
is no free lunch in economics and trade-offs exist. The cost of capital has 
been high in New Zealand, which could explain some of the relatively low 
productivity growth, see Prescott (2002), Hall and Hall and Scobie (2005), and 
Razzak (2007).
These plots seem to suggest that monetary policy of low and stable inflation 
did not prevent boom-bust cycles in the housing markets. Obviously none of 
the central banks in our sample targets asset prices.  There is a significant 
negative correlation between the real interest rates and housing price at the 
business cycle frequency.  There is no evidence of any correlation between 
real interest rates and house prices at the business cycle in both New 
Zealand and Australia.
6. Conclusions 
Our objective was to provide a nonparametric methodology to evaluating 
inflation-targeting regimes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and 
the UK.  We believe that evaluators ought to use variety of methods instead of 
relying on one particular approach, for completeness and robustness.  In 
particular, we tested three possible implications of inflation targeting as a 
policy.  First is a welfare implication and second is a real variability 
implication.  Successful inflation targeting reduces inflation, which in turns 
reduces the cost of living and perhaps increase welfare in the short to medium 
runs.
We used a variety of methods to test whether distributions remained 
unchanged or not under two different policy regimes.  We found that the 
distribution of the level of consumption per person is dominant under inflation 
targeting, and in all five countries, and also when inflation was low in the US, 
which is not an inflation targeting regime, after March 1984.  Similarly, the A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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growth rate of consumption per capita is dominant under inflation targeting in 
three out of the five inflation targeting countries.
The level of leisure per person, however, did not increase under inflation 
targeting, except for Sweden.  And it did not increase in the US during the 
period of low inflation rate.  People seem to have been working longer hours 
in all other countries over the period of inflation targeting and decided to 
substitute consumption for leisure.  We would only speculate that low interest 
rates and stable macroeconomic conditions encourage more consumption in 
the short run.  Lower wage inflation also means higher real wages and less 
consumption of leisure. 
The second implication of inflation targeting is real variability. We tested 
whether the conditional variability of consumption per person, leisure per 
person, real GDP per person and the exchange rate depreciation rate 
remained unchanged across policy regimes or have experienced statistically 
significant large, and sudden shifts.  In addition to the commonly used 
univariate test for equality of the variance, we introduced a multivariate test, 
where the Sample Generalized Variance is computed and a test statistic is 
derived.
We found that, real consumption per person, real leisure per person and the 
real depreciation rate exhibited more or less a similar variability under 
inflation-targeting regimes and earlier regimes.  Across all countries and the 
real variables above, we identified a similar number of incidents of statistically 
significant large and sudden jumps in the conditional variance during various 
periods of pre and during inflation targeting regimes.
We identified, however, as expected, variability increases at the regimes’ 
switching periods.  Some variables are more variable than others such as 
GDP per and leisure per person growth rates.  And, some countries 
experienced more variability in some variables than others such as Sweden 
and the UK while others like Canada and New Zealand seem to have less 
variability under inflation targeting.  For the US, we found no significant 
variability in either period, except at the point of the regime shift in 1984, 
consistent with Stock and Watson (2002). 
Finally, we examine the boom-bust cycles under inflation targeting and 
compare that with the US.  We found incidents of low and negative real 
interest rates in all countries, except for New Zealand.  Australia had five 
quarters of negative real interest rates in the entire sample.  For these two 
countries, there is no correlation between real interest rates and housing 
prices at the business cycles. The correlation between the real interest rates 
and house prices are significantly negative over the business cycle, which is 
typically associated with bubbles.     
We conclude that inflation targeting per se does not lead to welfare 
improvement, less or more real variability (more stability), or prevent boom-
bust cycles in housing markets, but regimes of low and stable inflation 
generally do experience higher levels of consumption per person and maybe A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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higher growth rates of consumption.  We found no evidence of statistically 
significant shift in the conditional variance of real variables, which does not 
lend a lot of support to the Great Moderation story.  Boom-bust cycles in 
housing markets cannot be prevented by inflation targeting regimes unless 
the real interest rates are kept reasonably and systematically high.A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Data Appendix 
The main sources of the data are: 
OECD.stat: OECD online data base 8Hwww.oecd.org
IFS: International Financial Statistics database, August 2008 (CD-ROM) IMF  
ILO: Statistics and databases on line 9Hwww.ilo.org
:
"
c  is the natural logarithm of private consumption per person in the working 




h  is the natural logarithm of average weekly hours worked per person in the 
working age 15-64 years old. Quarterly frequency.  Annual total hours worked 
per worker extracted from OECD then we divided it by 52 weeks to get  
average weekly hours worked per worker. Source: OECD 
:
"
l  is the logarithm of average weekly leisure hours per person in the working 
age 15-64 years old.  ) 100 log( H l  
"
 the assumption is that the population of 
working age 15-64 has 100 productive hours per week. Quarterly frequency.
Source: OECD 
Output is the natural logarithm of real GDP per person in the working age 15-
64 years old.  Quarterly frequency and seasonally adjusted.  Source: OECD 
Population is the population at working age 15-64 years old. Quarterly 
frequency.  Source: OECD 
The real effective exchange rate is quarterly frequency and the source is the 
IFS
The consumer price index, quarterly frequency and the source is the IFS 
The nominal interest rates are short term rates from the IFS. For the US we 
use the federal fund rate; for Australia we use short-term rate from OECD; for 
New Zealand we use 3-month bill rate; for Canada we use the treasury bill 
rate from the IFS and the same is for the UK. For Sweden we use the 3-
month treasury discount notes.
The house price index for the US is from the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae; 
for Australia is from Australian Bureau of Statistics; for Canada is from Stat 
Canada; for New Zealand is from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand; for 
Sweden is from Sweden bureau of statistics; and for the UK is from is from a 
website called Nationwide.  All data are seasonally adjusted.A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Code to calculate the multivariate statistics for sudden shifts in the 
moments SAS-IML 




read all into x var {&variables}; 
k=&k;/*-number of samples-*/ 
s=&s; /*- sample size-*/ 
p=ncol(x); /*-number of variables-*/ 




shape= p*(s-p)/2 ; 
start qc; 
do h=s to n by s; 
gp=x(|(h-s+1):h,|); 
mgp=gp(|:,|);





 if h=s then do ; 
ssp=ssg;;dcov=dcovg ;  end; 












colchr={'Z1' 'Z2' 'Z3' 'Z4' 'Z5' 'Z6' 'Z7' 'Z8' }; 





output2=output2//(sample`||gamma||u1||q1);A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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colchr2={'Sample' 'Gam' 'u1' 'Q1'}; 
output=output//(sample`||t2||u||q||dcov); 
colchr1={'SAMPLE' 'T SQUARE' 'U' 'Q' 'DET S'}; 
*print cov(|colname=colchr rowname=colchr|); 
* print output(|colname=colchr1|); 
* print output2(|colname=colchr2|) ; 
create p0 from  output(|colname=colchr1|); 
append from output; 
close p0; 
create p1  from  output2(|colname=colchr2|); 






run  main ; 
quit;
proc print data=p0; 
title "Country=&dataset"; 
title2'IML OUTPUT Dataset=P0'; 
run;
proc print data=p1; 




 input Year$  GDP  RER   Consumption  Leisure….; A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Before Inflation TargetingB   After Inflation Targeting A
Australia Mean  Standard Deviation  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Inflation   7.36  3.06   2.60#  1.44#
Leisure -0.006  0.74  -0.23$  1.24$
Consumption   -0.41  1.51   2.41$  1.24#
GDP    1.05  2.67   1.81$  1.00#
Real Exchange Rate  -1.58   9.83   1.27  6.83#
Canada        
Inflation    6.35  3.10   2.10#  1.21#
Leisure   -0.10  0.85  -0.02$  0.58#
Consumption    1.52  2.46   1.67$  1.54#
GDP    1.16  2.31   1.19 (?)  1.46#
Real Exchange Rate    1.47  5.64   0.09  6.16$
New Zealand        
Inflation   11.88    5.12     2.32#          1.44#
Leisure   0.74      0.55   -0.13#      0.49#
Consumption   1.02      2.102   1.80$      2.04#
GDP   0.26      1.36    1.27$       1.76$
Real Exchange Rate   1.25      9.16    0.59    8.06 (?) 
Sweden        
Inflation   7.81  3.22   1.50#  1.30#
Leisure   0.02  0.55   0.06(?)  0.65#
Consumption   1.00  2.69   1.73$  1.61#
GDP*   0.84  1.90   1.86$ 1.56#
Real Exchange Rate   0.42  5.76  -0.64  5.44#
UK          
Inflation   7.49  4.19   2.77#  0.86#
Leisure -0.001    1.00  -0.13$  0.66#
Consumption   2.62  2.87   2.45(?)  1.18#
GDP   1.36  1.85   1.68$  0.72#
Real Exchange Rate   1.16   8.70   0.94  6.39#
        
USA        
Inflation   8.34  2.7   3.00#  1.01#
Leisure -0.11  0.5  -0.07$  0.43#
Consumption   0.18  2.7   1.76$  1.23#
GDP   1.22  2.6   1.85$  1.26#
Real Exchange Rate   1.13  8.0  -2.40  7.68#
Inflation-targeting regime is defined over the period March 1993 – December 2007 in Australia; March 1991 – December 2007 in 
Canada; March 1990-December 2007 in New Zealand; March 1993 – December 2007 in Sweden; and March 1992 – December 2007 
in the UK.  For the US, the period of high inflation is June 1975 to March 1983 and the period of low inflation is March 1984 to
December 2007. The data are annualized growth rates defines as 100 * ) ln (ln 4   t t x x .Inflation is CPI inflation.  Leisure is 
t h  100 and t h is average weekly hours-worked per person (15-64).  Consumption is per capita (per person of working age (15-
64)).  GDP is real GDP per capita growth. The real exchange rate depreciation rate is  100 * ) ln (ln 4   t t q q where  t q is the 
effective real exchange rate. The OECD GDP for Sweden has a very clear downward shift in the level around 1990, which must be 
interpreted carefully. A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Table 2 : Tests for distributions











value A B 
P B median A median  P value B A 
t c ˆ ln
i       
Australia   0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000 
Canada   0.000  0.048  0.000  0.000 
NZ   0.001  0.200  0.001  0.000 
Sweden   0.000  0.083  0.000  0.000 
UK   0.000  0.009  0.000  0.000 
USA   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
) ˆ 100 ln( t h 
ii       
Australia   0.000  0.897  0.000  0.000 
Canada   0.981  0.499  0.847  0.966 
NZ   0.045  0.339  0.167  0.138 
Sweden   0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
UK   0.000  0.836  0.000  0.000 
USA   0.000  0.997  0.000  0.000 
t c ˆ ln        
Australia   0.000  0.252  0.000  0.000 
Canada   0.212  0.572  0.319  0.006 
NZ   0.275  0.374  0.428  0.416 
Sweden   0.026  0.375  0.033  0.001 
UK   0.990  0.501  0.845  0.027 
USA   0.954  0.509  0.642  0.083 
) ˆ 1 ln( t h         
Australia   0.397  0.548  0.561  0.281 
Canada   0.151  0.417  0.550  0.043 
NZ   0.000  0.880  0.001  0.000 
Sweden   0.299  0.442  0.175  0.332 
UK   0.712  0.479  0.557  0.103 
USA   0.856  0.490  0.818  0.238 
A denotes period under inflation-targeting regime and  B is the period before inflation targeting. The periods 
before inflation targeting are: March 1980 to December 1992 for Australia; March 1980 to December 1990 for 
Canada; March 1980 to December 1989 for New Zealand; March 1980 to December 1992 for Sweden and 
March 1980 to December 1991 for the UK.  For the US, the period of high inflation  B is from June 1975 to 
March 1983 and the period of low inflation policy  A is March 1984 to December 2007. 
In column 3 H0 is that  B A  and the p value is for  0 | |   Z prob
In column 4 we report  } { } { A B p 
i t c ˆ ln denotes consumption per capita. 
ii ) ˆ 100 ln( t h  denotes leisure per capita. 
* The test is in Hope, A. C. A. (1968).  We calculate Pearson, Fisher’s exact and one-sided Fisher’s exact p 
values but  do not report them because the values are identical to the one we reported here. A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Table 3 Multivariate Statistics for Sudden Shift in the Conditional Sample 
Generalized Variance 
Australia 
Before Inflation Targeting  After Inflation Targeting 
Sample ) ( k i D R Sample  ) ( k i D R
81-82 -0.90  94-95    3.05
*
83-84   0.81  96-97   2.04
#
85-86   2.17
# 98-99   0.77 
87-88 -1.40  00-01    1.09 
89-90   1.28  02-03   1.64 
91-92   0.33  04-05   0.91 
   06-07  -1.04 
Asterisk denotes significant shift beyond the  
 3 tolerance limits.   
The fact that the first observation of the inflation-targeting regime is significant  
may be due to a change in the regime, thus economically predicted. 
# denotes significant at the  
 2 tolerance level. 
Canada
Before Inflation Targeting  After Inflation Targeting 
Sample
i ) ( k i D R Sample  ) ( k i D R
Sep80-Mar82   4.97
* 92-93 -0.42 
Jun82-Dec83   0.69  94-95   1.41 
Mar84-Sep85  -0.18 96-97    1.30 
Dec85-Jun87   2.25
# 98-99   1.04 
Sep87-Mar89  -1.16 00-01    1.40 
Jun89-Dec90  -1.85 02-03    1.05 
04-05 -0.25 
05-07   0.55 
i  The sample size is 7. 
Asterisk denotes significant shift beyond the  
 3 tolerance limits.  
 # denotes significant at the  
 2 tolerance level. 
New Zealand 
Sample  ) ( k i D R
87-88
i  2.47 
89-90   3.12
*
91-92   0.60 
93-94 -0.32 
95-96 -0.21 
97-98 -0.15   





i Sample is from September 1987. 
ii Sample ends in June 2007. 
Asterisk denotes significant shift beyond the  
 3 tolerance limits. # denotes significant at the 

 2 tolerance level. A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Sweden 
Before Inflation Targeting  After Inflation Targeting 
Sample
i ) ( k i D R Sample
ii ) ( k i D R
81-82   -0.14  Mar93-Jun94   6.27
*
83-84 -1.08  Sep94-Dec95   1.12 
85-86 -2.44
# Mar96-Jun97  -0.18
87-88 -0.45  Sep97-Dec98  -1.07
89-90 -1.18  Mar99-Jun00  -0.18
91-92   4.61






i The sample is 8 observations. 
ii The sample is 6 observations. 
Asterisk denotes significant shift beyond the  
 3 tolerance limits.   
The fact that the first observation of the inflation-targeting regime is significant  
may be due to a change in the regime, thus economically predicted. 
 # denotes significant at the  
 2 tolerance level. 
UK 
Before Inflation Targeting  After Inflation Targeting 
Sample
i ) ( k i D R Sample
ii ) ( k i D R
80-82   1.92  Jun92-Dec93   0.54 
83-84 -0.70  Mar94-Sep95   1.47 
85-86   1.08  Dec95-Jun97   0.61 
87-88   0.42  Sep97-Mar99  -0.53
89-90 -1.80  Jun99-Dec00   0.17 






i The sample size is 8 and from June 1980 to March 1992. 
ii The sample size is 7. 
Asterisk denotes significant shift beyond the  
 3 tolerance limits.  
 # denotes significant at the  
 2 tolerance level. A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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US 
Period of High Inflation   Period of Low Inflation 
) ( k i D R Sample ) ( k i D R
Jun75-Mar77 -1.87  84-85  3.53
*
Jun77-Mar79 1.36  86-87  1.90 
Jun80-Mar81 1.88  88-89  1.18 
Jun81-Mar83 2.42
# 90-91 0.83 
   92-93  1.53 







The sample size is 8 and from June 1980 to March 1992. 
Asterisk denotes significant shift beyond the  
 3 tolerance limits.  
# denotes significant at the  
 2 tolerance level. A Nonparametric Approach To Evaluating Inflation-Targeting Regimes  
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Figure 5: Univariate Statistics For Sudden Change in The Variance
 GDP Per Capita Growth 
Before Inflation Targeting After Inflation Targeting
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Figure 6:Univariate Statistics For Sudden Change in The Variance
Consumption Growth 
Before Inflation Targeting After Inflation Targeting
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Figure 7:Univariate Statistics For Sudden Change in The Variance
Leisure Growth 
Before Inflation Targeting After Inflation Targeting
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Figure 8:Univariate Statistics For Sudden Change in The Variance
Real Exchange Rate Depreciation 
Before Inflation Targeting After Inflation Targeting
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Figure 9 Multivariate Statistics For Sudden Change in The Variance 
Before Inflation Targeting After Inflation Targeting
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Figure 12 
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i For two independent samples  m X X  , 1 and n Y Y  1 , Wilcoxon (1945) introduced the linear 
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	 . In the 
presence of ties, the U statistic is modified by adding  2 / ) ( i j X Y I  .
ii The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics is (Kolmogorov (1933) and Smirnov (1939), Conover 
(1999) is not very powerful against differences in the tails of the distributions.  It is, however, 
very powerful for alternative hypotheses that involve clustering in the data.  The statistics to 
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 , where  ) (x F and ) (x G are the empirical distribution functions for the 
sample that we are comparing. The combined statistic is  |) | |, max(|
 &  D D D . The p value 
for this statistic can be obtained by evaluating the asymptotic limiting distribution. Let 1 n be the 
sample size for the first sample and 2 n is the sample for the second sample. Smirnov (1939) 
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z i z D n n n n . The first five terms 
form the approximation a P used in the calculation (see STATA reference book). The exact p 
value is calculated by a counting algorithm (Gibbons (1971, p. 27-131). A corrected p value 
was obtained by modifying the asymptotic p value using a numerical approximation technique 
) /( 35 . 1 ) , max( / 09 . 2 ) , min( / 04 . 1 ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 n n n n n n n n P Z a &  & &  
 and p value =  ) (Z  ,
where  is the cumulative normal distribution function. 
iii Chebyshev's inequality (also known as Tchebysheff's inequality, Chebyshev's theorem, or 
the Bienaymé-Chebyshev inequality) states that in any data sample or probability distribution, 
nearly all the values are close to the mean value, and provides a quantitative description of 
nearly all and close to, For any 1  k , the following example (where  k / 1  
 ) meets the 
bounds exactly.  So 
2 2 / 1 ) 1 Pr( k X   ;
2 / 1 1 ) 0 Pr( k x    and
2 2 / 1 ) 1 Pr( k X    for that 
distribution
2 / 1 |) Pr(| k k X    
 , . Equality holds exactly for any distribution that is a linear 
transformation of this one. Inequality holds for any distribution that is not a linear 
transformation of this one. 
iv Anderson (1958) shows that the determinant of 
2 S  is proportional to the sum of squares of 
the volumes of all parallelopes formed by using as principle edgesvectors of   X X X  , , 2 1
as one set of end points, and the mean of X as the other with
  ) 1 (
1
n
 as the factor of 
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v A SAS – IML code to calculate the multivariate statistics for the case of three and more 
variables is in the appendix.  
vi we tested all variables for unit root using a variety of common unit root tests with different 
specifications and lag specifications.  We tested these lags thoroughly using a variety of 
common information criteria (Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981), Said and Dickey (1984), Dickey 
and Pentula (2002), Perron (1990, 1988, 1989 and 1997), Phillips (1987), and Elliott (1999)).   
We could not reject the unit root hypothesis.  These results may reflect the weak powers of 
these tests.  We tested the data again for a shorter samples, after inflation targeting to avoid 
potential the break in the data.  We still could not reject the unit root hypothesis.  Sweden 
seems to have a break around 1990.  Non rejection of the unit root for GDP per person, 
consumption per person, and leisure per person for Sweden could well be due to the break in 
the data, but the Perron test still does not reject the null.  It is well understood that all common 
unit root tests lack power. 
vii Changes in hours and leisure are small for long periods then they increase suddenly. 
viii All calculations are available upon requests. 
ix The early version of this paper which is a working paper at the Arab Planning Institute and 
the Economics and Econometrics Institute report wrong results for the UK.  We found a bug in 
the code and fixed it.
x That said, monetary policy is not the only effect on the supply of labour.  Fiscal policy, 
namely tax policy, also has an intratemporal effect on the level of hours worked.  Taxes distort 
the relative price of consumption and leisure.  In the neoclassical model, an expected 
increase in the tax rate reduces the supply of labour. Hence, increases leisure.  Sweden has 
the largest tax rate among the countries in the sample.  Nickell (2003), p 12 table 2, computes 
the tax wedge for some of the countries in our sample over intervals from 1960 to 2000.  The 
tax wedge in Sweden has increased from 34 percent in 1960-1964 to 77 percent in 1996-
2000, which should explain why leisure increased (literature on labour supply that suggest 
Sweden home production is high, Olovsson (2009)).  In New Zealand, the opposite 
happened. New Zealanders tax rates declined substantially after the economic reforms in 
1984 and during the period of inflation targeting from 1989, which might explain why Kiwis 
work longer hours.